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1204 
“DISHONESTY” IN FACT: THE FUTURE UNCERTAINTY OF 
MARYLAND’S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF GOOD 
FAITH & ENCOURAGING LAX LENDER LIABILITY 
KARA N. ACHILIHU 
Commercial law, ever-present in most aspects of people’s modern 
lives, is an intricate system of laws that governs businesses, commerce, and 
consumer transactions.1  The Uniform Commercial Code, originally pub-
lished in 1952, serves as a vessel for commercially related transactions oc-
curring in the United States—transcribing measures and policies for con-
sumers, merchants, and institutions alike to follow.2  Each separate article 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC” or “Code”) addresses a particu-
lar area of commercial law, and Article 1 sets the stage for how those prin-
ciples of interpretation are to be made.3  Article 1 contains the two-prong 
definition of good faith—“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing”—which relates to the Code-wide ob-
ligation of good faith.4  Notably, the good faith standard regulates the be-
havior of commercial machines such as banks, which continue to gain nega-
tive press for malfeasance against customers.5 
Although the Uniform Commercial Code is not federal law, all fifty 
states have adopted this model set of laws; thus, nearly all states closely fol-
low its provisions and amendments within their own statutory schemes.6  
Exceptions do exist, however.  Maryland is one of the few states that have 
yet to adopt the two-prong standard of good faith, leaving the Maryland 
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 1.  Commercial Law, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commercial_law 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 2.  See infra Part I.A.1. 
 3.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 4.  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2017) (emphasis added); Id. § 1-304. 
 5.  Ryan Cooper, A Brief History of Crime, Corruption, and Malfeasance at American 
Banks, WEEK (Oct. 9, 2017), http://theweek.com/articles/729052/brief-history-crime-corruption-
malfeasance-american-banks.  
 6.  See infra note 59 and accompanying text.  
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Uniform Commercial Code’s definition as merely “honesty in fact in the 
conduct or transaction concerned.”7 
Part I of this Comment begins by exploring the origins and legislative 
history of the Uniform Commercial Code.8  Part I also delves into the de-
velopment of Article 1’s good faith standard—both through the subjective 
and objective characterization—and how such changes shifted to other Ar-
ticles.9  Next, this Comment presents Maryland’s “version” of the UCC, in-
cluding its departure from the Uniform Commercial Code’s homogenous 
definition of good faith, leaving the sole “honesty in fact” definition.10  A 
brief summary of cases decided under both the subjective and subjective-
objective standard will follow, analyzing the various consequences in a 
banking context specifically.11 
Part II of this Comment presents arguments in favor of the Maryland 
General Assembly adopting the Uniform Commercial Code’s amendment 
to Article 1 in its entirety for the sake of promoting commercial uniformity 
with other states,12 clarity on how the judicial application of the standard 
should occur,13 and fairness to consumers and others involved in relation-
ships with banks.14  In conclusion, this Comment recommends that the 
Maryland General Assembly adopt the Uniform Commercial Code’s 
amendment to Article 1’s definition of good faith to include the “ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”15 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Part I.A of this Comment explores the history of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, beginning with its distinctive contributors and commenta-
tors.16  Part I.A then discusses the introduction of good faith as a standard 
within Article 1 and its trajectory throughout other Articles.17  Next, Part 
I.B focuses on the enactment Maryland’s Uniform Commercial Code and 
the good faith standard under Title 1, Maryland’s version of Article 1.18  
Part I.B also describes the Maryland General Assembly’s 2012 amendment 
to Title 1 via passage of House Bill 700 and its ultimate effect on other Ti-
                                                          
 7.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 8.  See infra Part I.A.1. 
 9.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 10.  See infra Part I.B. 
 11.  See infra Part I.C. 
 12.  See infra Part II.A. 
 13.  See infra Part II.B. 
 14.  See infra Part II.C. 
 15.  See infra Part III. 
 16.  See infra Part I.A.1. 
 17.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 18.  See infra Part I.B.1. 
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tles.19  Finally, Part I.C briefly compares cases, in a lender liability frame-
work, decided both under the sole subjective standard of good faith and the 
two-prong standard containing both honesty in fact and observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing, to provide context to the out-
comes under both standards.20 
A.  The History of the Uniform Commercial Code 
1.  From Scattered Transactions to the Uniform Commercial Code: 
How Private Organizations and Practitioners Shaped the 
Future of Commercial Law 
In 1942, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), also known 
as the Uniform Law Commission, began a joint project of drafting the 
UCC.21  Prior to the enactment of the UCC, commercial transactions were 
mostly regulated by uniform laws prepared and promulgated by the 
NCCUSL.22  While those uniform laws were either adopted in every state or 
followed to a substantial degree by others, each law became engrained in 
statutes related to commercial transactions.23  However, the evolution of 
separate commercial laws and need for revisions hampered uniformity to 
“modern commercial practices.”24  Consequentially, the purpose of the 
UCC’s enactment would later be characterized as “(1) to simplify, clarify, 
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the 
continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and 
agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the vari-
ous jurisdictions.”25  The idea surfaced that each phase of a commercial 
transaction was so closely intertwined, from start to finish, which called for 
grouping those differing transactions into a single subject of commercial 
law.26 
As a novel project, compiling commercial subjects into the original 
Code required both funding and time commitment from those involved.27  
                                                          
 19.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
 20.  See infra Part I.C. 
 21.  U.C.C. general cmt. at 3 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N  2017). 
 22.  Id. at 2.  Those acts included the following: Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896); 
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (1906); Uniform Sales Act (1906); Uniform Bills of Lading Act 
(1909); Uniform Stock Transfer Act (1909); Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1918); and Uniform 
Trust Receipts Act (1933).  Id. at 2–3. 
 23.  Id. at 3. 
 24.  Id.   
 25.  U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2017). 
 26.  See supra note 21, at 3.  “A single transaction may very well involve a contract for sale, 
followed by a sale, the giving of a check or draft for a part of the purchase price, and the ac-
ceptance of some form of security for the balance.”  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 3–4. 
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The project received its main financial support from the Maurice and Laura 
Falk Foundation of Pennsylvania, along with ninety-eight business affiliates 
and law firms.28  The drafting process came with responsibility, as multiple 
drafts were considered and debated by joint committees of both organiza-
tions at meetings.29  The drafting and editorial work of the UCC took ten 
years before the first edition emerged, and an Editorial Board of advisers—
consisting of distinguished judges, practicing attorneys, legal scholars, pro-
fessors, and deans of various law schools—oversaw the task.30 
The Editorial Board of advisers, the Council of the ALI, and either the 
Commercial Acts Section or the Property Acts Section of the Conference of 
Commissioners approved the drafts before being submitted for discussion to 
the ALI and NCCUSL.31  If approved, the draft came before the general 
membership of the ALI and the NCCUSL.32  In addition to these final stag-
es, special subcommittees directed the review and discussion of each article 
with the purpose of providing recommendations to the Enlarged Editorial 
Board.33  Informal consultants—including businessmen, operating bankers, 
and a committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 
of the American Bar Association—regularly counseled those working on 
the Code.34  After final approval of the Code by the ALI and NCCUSL, and 
in accordance with the NCCUSL’s practices, both bodies jointly submitted 
the finalized version to the American Bar Association for approval by its 
House of Delegates.35 
After ten years of this prolonged process, the official text of the UCC 
was promulgated in 1951 and published in 1952.36  Pennsylvania became 
the first state to adopt the UCC in 1953, effective July 1, 1954.37  Over the 
years, additional official texts and revisions of the UCC appeared.38  Subse-
quently, other states followed in Pennsylvania’s footsteps and adopted the 
UCC.39  In 1961, the ALI and NCCUSL established the Permanent Editorial 
Board (“PEB”) to provide explanatory commentary on the Code, with the 
                                                          
 28.  Id. at 3.  Notably, the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation contributed a total of $275,000 
to the preparation of the Code.  U.C.C. report no. 1 (PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. 1962). 
 29.  See supra note 21.   
 30.  See supra note 21, at 4.  Esteemed Judge Herbert F. Goodrich of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit served as the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the 1952 edition.  
Id.  
 31.  See supra note 21, at 4. 
 32.  See supra note 21, at 4. 
 33.  See supra note 21, at 4–5.  The special subcommittees were assigned to one article each.  
Id. at 4. 
 34.  See supra note 21, at 7–8. 
 35.  See supra note 21, at 8. 
 36.  See supra note 21, at 2, 4. 
 37.  See supra note 21, at 2. 
 38.  U.C.C. report no. 1 (PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. 1962). 
 39.  Id. 
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intention of encouraging uniformity in response to states putting forth their 
own amendments.40  Currently, all fifty states and U.S. territories have 
adopted some version of the UCC.41 
2.  The Emergence of the “Good Faith” Standard: Governing the 
Behavior of Parties Under the Uniform Commercial Code 
Within Article 1 are general definitions and principles of interpreta-
tions present throughout all parts of the text—one of those important prin-
ciples being “good faith.”42  The concept of good faith arose from language 
stipulating that every contract or duty within the UCC imposed an obliga-
tion of good faith in its performance or enforcement, adopting a critical no-
tion from common law contract theory.43  This concept applied both broadly 
and narrowly, including governing the option to accelerate at will; the right 
to cure a defective delivery of goods; the duty of a merchant buyer who has 
rejected goods to effect salvage operations; substituted performance; and 
the failure of presupposed conditions.44  The standard of good faith also ap-
plied to the course of dealing between parties and parties’ usage of trade.45  
There is no independent cause of action for breach of good faith under the 
UCC; rather, failure to perform or enforce a duty or obligation in good faith 
constitutes a breach or makes unavailable, under certain circumstances, a 
remedial right of power.46  The doctrine of good faith simply allows for a 
court to interpret the commercial context in which contracts are created, 
performed, and enforced.47 
In Article 1, the UCC described how to define the obligation of good 
faith.48  Former Section 1-201(19) defined good faith as “honesty in fact in 
the conduct or transaction concerned.”49  This definition applied throughout 
the UCC except for in Article 2’s former Section 2-103(1)(b), where the 
                                                          
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See Gibraltar Fin. Corp. v. Prestige Equip. Corp., 949 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ind. 2011) (not-
ing that the UCC has been adopted by all fifty states, although not entirely uniform from state to 
state). 
 42.  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2017); see also Lisa D. Sparks, The Regression of “Good Faith” 
in Maryland Commercial Law, 47 U. BALT. L. F. 17, 18 (2016). 
 43.  U.C.C. § 1-304 (2017). 
 44.  U.C.C. § 1-203 official cmt. (2000).  The obligation of good faith is now referred to in 
Section 1-304.  U.C.C. § 1-304 (2017).   
 45.  U.C.C. § 1-203 official cmt. (2000).  For more information about course of dealing and 
usage of trade, see also U.C.C. § 1-303(b)–(c) (2017) (“A ‘course of dealing’ is a sequence of 
conduct concerning previous transactions . . . that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a com-
mon basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct. . . .  A ‘usage of 
trade’ is any practice or method . . . having such regularity of observance . . . to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”).  
 46.  U.C.C. § 1-304 official cmt. (2017). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 49.  U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (2000). 
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definition of good faith combined honesty in fact with “the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade”—a combina-
tion of both subjective and objective standards.50  However, Article 2’s def-
inition of good faith applied to transactions solely within the scope of said 
Article and to merchants only, limiting its reach.51  Over time, other Articles 
adopted Article 2’s concept of good faith, including both subjective honesty 
and objective commercial reasonableness.52  Article 2A incorporated Article 
2’s standard, while other Articles broadened the applicability of good faith 
beyond merchants to all parties.53  Articles 2 and 2A were eventually 
amended to extend the good-faith standard to non-merchants as well.54  On-
ly Article 5, which maintained the subjective component only, and Article 6 
(in the few states that have chosen not to remove the Article) were without 
the two-part standard of good faith.55 
In 2003, the UCC again revised Article 1’s definition of good faith to 
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing.”56  The reasoning behind this amendment came from the mul-
tiple cross-references of the subjective-objective definition in nearly every 
Article and the need for clarifying the scope of Article 1.57  This change ap-
plied to all definitions of good faith throughout the UCC, including the re-
cently revised Articles (except for Article 5).58  As of 2018, only eight states 
(including Maryland) have declined to adopt the subjective-objective stand-
ard of good faith set forth by Section 1-201(b)(20) of the UCC, and instead 
prescribe good faith to mean “honesty in fact” or “honesty in fact in the 
conduct or transaction concerned.”59 
                                                          
 50.  Id. § 2-103(1)(b); see also id. § 2-102 (“Unless the context other requires, [Article 2] ap-
plies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction . . . intended to operate only as a 
security transaction nor does [Article 2] impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, 
farmers or other specified classes of buyers.”). 
 51.  U.C.C. § 1-201 official cmt. 20 (2017). 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id.; see also Sparks, supra note 42, at 20 n.26 (detailing the Uniform Law Commission’s 
Reporter Notes behind the rationale for the change of the good faith definition in Article 1). 
 54.  U.C.C. § 1-201 official cmt. 20 (2017). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2003). 
 57.  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) official cmt. 20 (2017). 
 58.  Id.; see also Sparks, supra note 42, at 20. 
 59.  Hawaii follows an “honesty in fact” definition of good faith.  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
490:1-201(b) (LexisNexis 2009).  Aside from Maryland, the following states tack on the addition-
al language of “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned”: Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, 
New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  ALA. CODE § 7-1-201(b)(20) (LexisNexis 2006); IDAHO 
CODE § 28-1-201(b)(20) (2013); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 1-201(b)(20) (West 2009); N.Y. 
U.C.C. LAW § 1-201(b)(20) (McKinney 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-201(b)(20) (2015); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 401.201(2)(k) (West 2017). 
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B.  The History of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code 
1.  Nearly Fifty Years of the Trickle-Down Effect: The MUCC’s 
Evolution Following Enactment and UCC Amendments 
Enacted in 1963, the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code (“MUCC”) 
took effect on February 1, 1964.60  The purpose of the enactment was to in-
corporate the UCC into the Annotated Code of Maryland, providing legal 
uniformity with respect to certain commercial transactions.61  A decade later 
in 1975, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the new Commercial Law 
Article, formally designating leading Titles 1 through 10 as the MUCC and 
amending various provisions of the Annotated Code of Maryland.62  Cur-
rently, there are twenty-three titles within the Commercial Law Article, 
covering an expansive list of topics including consumer protection, debt 
collection, and property.63 
Identically to the UCC, the MUCC outlines general provisions, defini-
tions, and principles of interpretation in Title 1.64  Under Section 1-201, the 
explanation of “good faith” appeared as a result of the MUCC’s imposition 
of an obligation of good faith in every contract or duty.65  At the time of en-
actment, and as it stands today, good faith was defined as “honesty in fact 
in the conduct or transaction concerned.”66  This definition applies through-
out the MUCC except for in Title 2 governing sales.67  Former Section 2-
103(1)(b), now “Reserved,” provided that “‘[g]ood faith’ in the case of a 
                                                          
 60.  S.B. 77, 1963 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1963).  The MUCC was formally known as Article 
95B at the time of its enactment.  Id. 
 61.  Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-103 (LexisNexis 2013) (outlining the pur-
pose and policies of the MUCC as “(1) [t]o simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions; (2) [t]o permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through 
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and (3) [t]o make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions”). 
 62.  H.B. 26, 1975 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1975); see also Sparks, supra note 42, at 17–18, n. 
4.  The UCC refers to its sections as “articles,” but the language is synonymous with the MUCC’s 
use of “titles.”  To date, the categorization of the MUCC titles is as follows: Title 1: General Pro-
visions; Title 2: Sales; Title 2A: Leases; Title 3: Negotiable Instruments; Title 4: Bank Deposits 
and Collections; Title 4A: Funds Transfers; Title 5: Letters of Credit; Title 6: Bulk Transfers; Title 
7: Documents of Title; Title 8: Investment Securities; Title 9: Secured Transactions; and Title 10: 
Effective Date and Repealer. 
 63.  See generally MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11–23 (West 2013) (comprising the other 
topics of the Commercial Law Article). 
 64.  For a list of the general provisions, see generally id. § 1. 
 65.  Id. § 1-304.  There is no separate cause of action for breach of the good faith duty under 
Maryland law.  Marland v. Safeway, Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 135647, at *11–12 (4th Cir. Jan. 
17, 2003). 
 66.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-201(b)(20) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 67.  Id. § 2 (West 2013) (containing no definition of good faith). 
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merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commer-
cial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”68 
As the amendments of the UCC trickled down to the MUCC over the 
years, Title 2’s interpretation of good faith—both subjective honesty and 
objective commercial reasonableness—found its way to other Titles.69  Title 
2A simply adopted Title 2’s standard, while Titles 3, 4, 4A, 8, and 9 ex-
panded the applicability of the standard to all parties rather than just mer-
chants.70  Only revised Title 5 retained just the subjective “honesty in fact” 
component, and Titles 6 and 7 contained no definition of good faith.71  The 
result of these dispersed conditions was that where the subjective-objective 
definition did not appear in specific language, Title 1’s subjective definition 
governed the applicability of good faith.72 
2.  Maryland’s Statutory Erasure of Commercial Reasonableness in 
2012 
In 2012, the Maryland General Assembly unanimously enacted revi-
sions to the MUCC via passage of House Bill 700, which incorporated rem-
nants of the UCC’s revisions to Article 1 in 2003.73  Titled “Commercial 
Law—Uniform Commercial Code—Revisions to Title 1,” the bill stated the 
following purpose: 
[R]evising, updating, reorganizing, and clarifying Title 1 of the 
Maryland Uniform Commercial Code (MUCC) relating to gen-
eral provisions applicable to the MUCC; . . . clarifying the trans-
actions to which Title 1 of the MUCC applies; . . . defining cer-
tain terms; altering and repealing certain definitions; making 
conforming changes to certain provisions of the MUCC; and gen-
erally relating to the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code.74 
The House Economic Matters Committee introduced and first read 
House Bill 700 on February 8, 2012.75  In its initial stage, House Bill 700’s 
definition of good faith under Section 1-201 changed to “except as other-
                                                          
 68.  U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (2000).  Compare MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-103(1)(b) (West 
2013), with Tatum v. Richter, 280 Md. 332, 337, 373 A.2d 923, 926 (1977) (“[U]nder § 2-103(b), 
when the seller is a merchant, ‘honesty in fact’ has the additional meaning of ‘the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”) 
 69.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 1-201 cmt. 20 (LexisNexis 2013). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id.  In Maryland, the legislative stages of a bill are divided: (1) drafting of the bill; (2) 
introduction or first reading; (3) committee hearing, where testimony can be heard to determine 
amendment; (4) second reading; (5) third reading, where a roll call vote is taken; (5) passing to the 
second house for approval; (6) resolution of differences; and (7) action by the governor.  
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wise provided in Title 5 of this article, [good faith] means honesty in fact 
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”76  
This change made the following sections with identical language unneces-
sary and accordingly replaced each with “Reserved” placeholders: Sections 
2-103(1)(b), 3-103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6), 8-102(a)(10), and 9-102(a)(43).77  
Sections 2A-103(3) and 4-104(c), which contained the expanded good-faith 
provisions, were deleted altogether.78 
Prior to the Committee Hearing on House Bill 700, the House of Dele-
gates received a letter in support of the bill from the Chair of the Uniform 
Commercial Code Subcommittee of the Business Law Section of the Mary-
land State Bar Association, K. Lee Riley, Jr.79  Mr. Riley wrote, “Reasona-
ble commercial standards are added to the definition of ‘good faith’, provid-
ing an objective and fairer standard for courts to enforce. . . .”80  He also 
outlined the general basis of his support of House Bill 700: 
House Bill[] 700 . . . update[s] the Maryland Uniform Commer-
cial Code to make it consistent with the most recent version[] of 
the Uniform Commercial Code Article[] 1. . . . [This revision 
was] developed . . . to conform to modern business practices and 
to address a number of problems that have arisen over the past 
several years.  Commercial law has been the providence of state 
law since the formation of the United States.  However, as our 
commerce has become more global it is increasingly essential that 
commercial law be uniform.  That may be achieved through co-
ordinated cooperation of the states and jurisdictions . . . . Accord-
ingly, it is important for Maryland to complete the updates of the 
UCC to maintain and preserve the role of state law in commercial 
transactions.81 
The Committee also received a letter from the Commissioner of the 
Maryland Commission on Uniform State Laws, Steven N. Leitess, who 
more or less provided the same support, stating: “In the interest of maintain-
ing the vitality and vigor of state law responsive to changing business prac-
                                                          
 76.  H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (first reading). 
 77.  Id.; see also Sparks, supra note 42, at 20. 
 78.  H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (first reading); see also Sparks, supra note 
42, at 20. 
 79.  Letter from K. Lee Riley, Jr., Chair, UCC Subcomm. of the Bus. L. Sec., Md. St. Bar 
Ass’n, to Brian Feldman, Del., Md. H.D. concerning H.B. 700 and 713 (Feb. 21, 2012) (on file 
with the Maryland Department of Legislative Services and the Maryland Law Review).   
 80.  Id. at 2.  Following his letter, Mr. Riley attached an exhibit titled “Why States Should 
Adopt the Revised Uniform Commercial Code, Article 1–General Provisions (2001),” listing revi-
sions relating to scope, applicability of supplemental principles of law, course of performance, and 
the Statute of Frauds.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
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tices and technology, it is most important that Maryland’s UCC laws are 
current and up to date.”82 
During House Bill 700’s Committee Hearing on February 21, 2012, 
both Delegate Feldman and Mr. Riley testified in favor of the bill, citing the 
reasons outlined in the letters of support.83  Subsequently, a representative 
on behalf of the Maryland Bankers Association testified in objection to the 
change of the meaning of good faith.84  The representative expressed con-
cern with the substitution of the “dishonesty” standard with reasonable, 
“commercial standards that exist in the marketplace.”85  The representative 
did not further articulate why this change concerned the Maryland Bankers 
Association.86 
Following the committee hearing, an amendment to the good faith def-
inition was introduced.87  The amendments eradicated reasonable commer-
cial standards from Title 1’s definition of good faith, leaving merely “hon-
esty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”88  However, the 
amendment failed to reestablish the two-prong standard that had been re-
served or removed from certain sections in the first reading of the bill.89  
Following the hearing, the Committee read House Bill 700 for a second 
time on March 17, 2012, and the House of Delegates passed the amendment 
shortly thereafter.90 
House Bill 700’s legislative history does not expound on the reasoning 
behind the failure to adopt the two-prong good faith standard.91  House Bill 
700’s Revised Fiscal and Policy Note also did not distinguish between Title 
1’s definition of good faith in the analysis of the proposed bill and the cur-
rent law segments, nor did it mention the removal of the definition in other 
Titles.92  There have been no additional amendments to Title 1 passed by 
                                                          
 82.  Letter from Steven N. Leitess, Comm’r, Md. Comm’n on Unif. State Laws, to Brian 
Feldman, Del., Md. H.D. 3 (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with the Maryland Department of Legislative 
Services and with Maryland Law Review). 
 83.  Commercial Law–Uniform Commercial Code–Revisions to Title 1: Hearing on H.B. 700 
Before the H. Comm. on Economic Matters, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. Feb. 21, 2012) (state-
ments of Del. Brian J. Feldman), http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/mga/play/8b1591e5-f022-4c73-
8940-29ad8a7d4505/?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c.  
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  ECONOMIC MATTERS COMM., AMENDMENT TO H.B. 700, H.B. 700-863493-1, 2012 
Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).   
 88.  Id. 
 89.  H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012); see supra text accompanying notes 77–78. 
 90.  H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  H.B. 700, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (Revised Fiscal and Policy Note).  The 
analysis segment of the report stated, “The bill alters the definition of ‘good faith’ to mean hones-
ty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”  Id.  While, in the segment describing the cur-
rent law, “‘[g]ood faith’ is defined as honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”  Id.  
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the General Assembly since 2012.  As of 2018, the Maryland judiciary has 
yet to encounter any cases relying on the precise definition of good faith 
since House Bill 700.93 
C.  Measuring the Meaning of Good Faith Across Different 
Jurisdictions in the Lender Liability Framework 
1.  The “Honesty in Fact” Standard 
Along the way of each state eventually adopting the UCC into their 
statutory schemes, the respective courts of those states and federal courts 
have analyzed the meaning of good faith when pertaining to lender liabil-
ity.94  At the time of most states’ adoptions of the UCC—many occurring 
several decades ago—Article 1 contained the “honesty in fact” standard of 
good faith only.95  Thus, courts reasonably evaluated UCC claims pertain-
ing to “good faith” in accordance with that same language. 
Banks, as commercial and lending entities, are subject to UCC provi-
sions—frequently under the standard of good faith.96  In an Arizona case, 
the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that where a bank accepted checks 
bearing stamped endorsements, despite violating the bank’s own established 
procedures, such actions did not constitute a lack of good faith under Ari-
zona’s “honesty in fact” code standard.97  Although the bank in question 
had a policy against immediate credit on large checks, the court found there 
was no evidence that the bank’s officer acted fraudulently or dishonestly 
through their actions.98  Similarly, the Florida District Court of Appeal held 
that a where a bank wrongfully debited its corporate customer’s accounts in 
                                                          
 93.  Since the 2012 amendment, there have been very few cases that address good faith in the 
MUCC context at all.  See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Nextday Network Hardware Corp., 73 F. 
Supp.3d 636, 640–41 (D. Md. 2014) (discussing good faith purchasers under Title 2). 
 94.  See generally U.C.C. CASE DIG. (West, eds. 2009) (providing up-to-date coverage of all 
50 states interpreting and applying the UCC). 
 95.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Valley Bank of Nev. v. JER Mgmt., 719 P.2d 301, 306–07 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).  The 
bank failed to obtain a corporate resolution from the payee-depositor authorizing checking ac-
counts and naming authorized signatories, against its own policy.  Id. at 306.  One of the bank of-
ficers also made a decision to give the payee-depositor immediate credit on the checks, against 
directions and personal instinct.  Id.  The court’s focus was not on the possible violation by the 
bank of its own procedures in establishing the corporate checking account on the payee’s behalf, 
but on the conduct of the bank officer in permitting an immediate credit to the account for the en-
dorsed checks.  Id.; see also City of Phoenix v. Great W. Bank & Tr., 712 P.2d 966, 971 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1985) (rejecting the appellant’s claim of the appellee bank’s lack of good faith by differenti-
ating between lack of good faith and negligence). 
 98.  Valley Bank of Nev., 719 P.2d at 307.  The court reasoned that the bank officer’s actions 
were due to his desire to protect the interests of the bank, relying on the drawee bank’s oral assur-
ances that the checks would be paid.  Id.  There were no triable factual issues on the question of 
the bank’s good faith.  Id. 
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disregard of its corporate resolution requiring the signature of two officers, 
there was no bad faith on the bank’s behalf when considering Florida’s def-
inition of good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned.”99  Although the bank failed to discover its oversight and had not 
yet begun enforcing the two-signature requirement until it had invested 
$500,000 in the corporation, the court held such actions did not show bad 
faith.100  The court based its ruling on the bank’s subjective state of mind 
only, not considering any lack of commercial reasonableness.101 
Courts have also analyzed the “honesty in fact” good faith standard 
when banks deal with “insecure” or “at will” acceleration clauses.  One 
court found that a bank acted in good faith in exercising the option to accel-
erate at will when an agent of the bank (namely a creditor) acted on what 
they believed they knew, whether or not what they believed was accurate in 
terms of insecurity and called for additional collateral.102  Other courts 
found that it made no difference that the facts ultimately established that the 
creditor was wrong and payment was not impaired—relying on whether the 
creditor acted honestly, not reasonably.103 
The honesty in fact standard has also been referred to as “honesty in 
intent” by some courts.104  The Supreme Court of Minnesota accepted the 
definition of good faith as “honesty in fact or put another way, honesty in 
intent” in a check kiting scheme.105  As a subjective test, it required “hones-
                                                          
 99.  Espirito Santo Bank of Fla. v. Agronomics Fin. Corp., 591 So. 2d 1078, 1079–80 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1989)).  This case considered on appeal 
what kind of damages should have been awarded for the bank’s actions.  Id. at 1079.  The bank 
conceded to negligently debiting the accounts upon the signature of just one corporate officer, and 
the lower court awarded consequential damages and damages consisting of the improperly debited 
items.  Id.  The appellate court found that awarding consequential damages was inappropriate be-
cause absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the bank, the measure of damages should have 
been limited to the amounts of the items wrongfully transferred.  Id.  Although Florida’s specific 
statute did not define “bad faith,” the court held that bad faith is the lack of good faith.  Id. at 
1080. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Tr. Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 103.  Jackson v. State Bank of Wapello, 488 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Iowa 1992).  But see Barlett 
Bank & Tr. Co. v. McJunkins, 497 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (explaining that a promis-
sory note stating that in order to accelerate due to insecurity, a bank had to “reasonably” consider 
itself to be insecure, was indication of a requirement of a rational basis for the bank’s determina-
tion of insecurity in contrast to a mere subjective belief that payment or performance was im-
paired). 
 104.  See infra text accompanying notes 105–110. 
 105.  Town & Country State Bank of Newport v. First State Bank of St. Paul, 358 N.W.2d 387, 
392 (Minn. 1984).  A check kiting scheme involves the abuse of a bank’s procedure allowing cus-
tomers to write checks on “uncollected funds.”  Id. at 389.  Uncollected funds in an account repre-
sent funds posted to that account for deposited checks drawn on a separate bank but which have 
yet to be paid for said bank.  Id. at 390.  The process involves the depositary bank forwarding an 
accepted check to its clearinghouse, then to the drawee bank—a process that normally takes two 
days.  Id.  A customer who is short of funds can obtain an interest-free “loan” within those two 
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ty of intent rather than absence of circumstances which would put an ordi-
narily prudent holder on inquiry.”106  The trial court found that there was 
evidence supporting that the bank had neither acted in bad faith nor acted 
with any dishonest intent to shift the kite loss to other banks.107  Another 
case mentioned the honesty of intent test where a bank took from a corpora-
tion—in whose assets the bank had a security interest—cashier’s checks 
given by the plaintiff for the purchase of the corporation’s business and en-
dorsed by the corporation’s president.108  The court found that the bank 
should be held to the honesty in fact standard only and had no duty to in-
quire into the potentially irregular nature of the transaction.109  There was 
no indication that the bank had failed the honesty of intent test.110 
A shift in the interpretation of “honesty in fact” occurred in J.R. Hale 
Contracting Company v. United New Mexico Bank at Albuquerque.111  In 
this case, a debtor brought suit claiming the bank had wrongfully accelerat-
ed a $400,000 promissory note despite a pre-existing relationship of ex-
cused late payments.112  The court held that when a bank accelerates pay-
ments under a promissory note because it believes “in good faith” that the 
debtor’s prospect for repayment is impaired, Section 1-208 of the UCC re-
quired the application of a subjective standard of good faith rather than an 
objective standard of commercial reasonableness.113  Nevertheless, the court 
held that the determination of the ultimate fact (i.e. whether the bank lacked 
a good faith belief in the impairment of its prospect for repayment) should 
be based on facts and circumstances surrounding the acceleration and not 
solely on the bank’s testimony concerning its state of mind.114 
The result of J.R. Hale meant that even under a subjective test of good 
faith, when the trier of fact evaluates the credibility of a bank’s claims, the 
                                                          
days by waiting for the check to clear, writing a series of bad checks for deposit and withdrawal 
and thus creating fraudulent credit for the preceding check.  Id. 
 106.  Id. (quoting Eldon’s Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 207 N.W.2d 282, 287 
(Minn. 1973)). 
 107.  Town & Country State Bank of Newport, 358 N.W.2d at 392.  Rather, the bank’s actions 
were an attempt to “carry” a long-established banking relationship with a customer who had pre-
viously rectified overdraft situations to see if the cash flow problem could be resolved.  Id.  
 108.  Leininger v. Anderson, 255 N.W.2d 22, 25–26 (Minn. 1977). 
 109.  Id. at 29–30.  
 110.  Id. at 29. 
 111.  799 P.2d 581 (N.M. 1990). 
 112.  Id. at 583–84.  The company had been a customer of the bank for approximately eleven 
years prior to this case.  Id. at 583.  During that time, the company entered into several revolving 
credit notes with the bank in increased amounts each time.  Id.  The bank continued to renew the 
notes on or about the due date despite the company’s frequent late payments.  Id. at 583–84.  On 
those occasions, the bank never took action other than contacting the company to request pay-
ments be made up to date, which the company complied with.  Id. at 584. 
 113.  Id. at 591. 
 114.  Id. 
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fact-finder may take into account the reasonableness of that claim.115  Con-
sequently, the conduct and credibility of the bank may be tested by objec-
tive standards subject to proof and conducive to the application of reasona-
ble expectations in commercial affairs.116  The ruling in J.R. Hale signaled 
the change to come, thirteen years later, to the UCC’s definition of good 
faith.117 
2.  The Incorporation of the “Observance of Reasonable 
Commercial Standards of Fair Dealing” Standard 
The 2003 amendment to the UCC’s definition of good faith catapulted 
most of the fifty states’ emulation of such standard within their own 
codes.118  Yet many years prior to the amendment, some courts had already 
incorporated commercial reasonableness into the good faith standard.  In 
states that chose to adopt the change, their respective courts adjusted their 
analysis to include the objective, commercial reasonableness standard.119  In 
K.M.C. Company v. Irving Trust Company,120 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a lender who refused to continue 
funding a line of credit under a loan agreement was nonetheless liable for 
lack of good faith when it failed to notify the borrower prior to termination 
and the borrower’s business collapsed.121  The court stated that the demand 
provision was subject to a good faith standard of reasonableness and fair-
ness.122  The court first examined the lender’s subjective beliefs about the 
borrower’s financial situation.123  The court cautioned that such beliefs need 
not be correct, but must be reasonable.124  If the lender’s view was indeed 
reasonable, the court analyzed the reasonableness of the lender’s response 
to the situation; the lender’s actions would not violate the good-faith obliga-
tion so long as they represented the actions of a reasonable lender under 
similar circumstances.125  The court held that although the loan officer rea-
                                                          
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See supra Part I.C.2. 
 118.  See supra text accompanying note 59. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 121.  Id. at 760. 
 122.  Id.  “The demand provision is a kind of acceleration clause, upon which the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the courts have imposed limitations of reasonableness and fairness.”  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 761–62 (stating that if the loan officer’s subjective beliefs were dispositive, the evi-
dence would have likely been insufficient to support a breach of good faith). 
 124.  Id. at 761.  “While it is not necessary that [the loan officer has] been correct in his under-
standing of the facts and circumstances pertinent to his decision not to advance funds . . . to find 
that he made a valid business judgment in doing so, there must at least be some objective basis 
upon which a reasonable loan officer in the exercise of his discretion would have acted in that 
manner.”  Id.  
 125.  Id. at 761–62. 
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sonably believed certain facts about the borrower’s weakened financial 
condition, he did not act reasonably in refusing to advance the funds with-
out prior notice, and thus violated his obligation of good faith.126 
Two years later, in 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit considered whether a bank lacked good faith when terminating 
a credit arrangement in Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, Inc.127  In this 
case, the plaintiffs entered into a $25,000 credit agreement with the bank.128  
After three months, the bank abruptly discontinued its line of credit once 
receiving false information that the borrowers were mismanaging their 
business.129  As a result, the plaintiffs lost their home and business.130  Alt-
hough the good faith standard at the time only included “honesty in fact,” 
the trial judge concluded that the good faith test was to include an objective 
standard of reasonableness, which the defendant challenged.131  Despite a 
loan agreement containing various provisions rendering the note payable on 
demand after enumerated events, the First Circuit held that the bank’s fail-
ure to both warn the borrowers before terminating further credit advances 
and negotiate alternative solutions with the borrowers constituted bad 
faith.132 
While the above cases do not encompass all outcomes in cases involv-
ing the good faith standard in relation to banks, the trend is certain: when a 
bank’s action is called into question within an “honesty in fact” jurisdiction, 
the bank’s own subjectivity of its actions takes precedence over any reason-
able commercial practices.  As a result, borrowers and other plaintiffs may 
be unsuccessful with bringing claims against banks, even in egregious situa-
tions.  However, jurisdictions that include the addition of objective, com-
mercial reasonableness to the definition of good faith often impose some 
level of accountability against banks where necessary.  The stark difference 
between courts' analyses of the singular and two-prong classifications, and 
the ensuing impact on consumers, serves as a compelling reason for all 
states to adhere to Article 1’s current definition of good faith. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
This Part argues that Maryland should adopt the UCC’s 2003 amend-
ment to Article 1 in its entirety.  Part II.A discusses how good faith under 
Title 1 of the MUCC, in its current state, fails to adhere to the basic (and 
                                                          
 126.  Id. at 763. 
 127.  821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 128.  Id. at 11. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 14. 
 132.  Id. at 16.   
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arguably most important) principle of uniformity advanced by the UCC.133  
Next, Part II.B posits that the vague, subjective notion of “honesty in fact” 
pales in comparison, when interpreted by the courts and others, to the two-
prong standard including the observance of reasonable commercial stand-
ards of fair dealing.134  Part II.C explains how the MUCC’s definition of 
good faith opens the door to abuse by banking institutions, and why 
amendment to Title 1 should be welcomed by all, including banks.135  Final-
ly, Part II.D advances possible theories as to why the Maryland legislature 
has failed to amend Title 1 to Article 1.136 
A.  Maryland’s Departure from Article 1 Disrupts Uniformity Amongst 
States, Undermining the Essential Purpose of the Uniform 
Commercial Code 
The structure of the American legal system permits each state to im-
plement laws that are deemed best for that state, either through administra-
tive, judicial, or legislative procedure.137  As a result, state law is only ap-
plicable within that particular state’s jurisdiction.138  Through a state’s 
legislative process, an opportunity for adoption of critical uniform laws 
arises.139  Although uniform laws set exemplary guidelines for states to fol-
low, state legislatures may elect to reject them, enact them in entirety, or 
enact them with modifications.140  Yet, there are a number of subject mat-
ters that necessitate adherence to uniform laws in all states.141  Perhaps as 
one of the most prominent examples, commercial transactions almost al-
ways transcend state lines in one way or another.142 
Article 1 is arguably the most critical of the UCC, setting the stage for 
the interpretation of other Articles.  Article 1’s goal is to achieve uniformity 
by providing definitions and general provisions that apply as default rules 
covering commercial transactions throughout the UCC, absent conflicting 
                                                          
 133.  See infra Part II.A. 
 134.  See infra Part II.B. 
 135.  See infra Part II.C. 
 136.  See infra Part II.D. 
 137.  An Overview of the Uniform Commercial Code, LAWINFO, 
https://resources.lawinfo.com/business-law/an-overview-of-the-uniform-commercial-code.html 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Deanna Barmakian & Terri Saint-Amour, Uniform Laws and Model Acts, HARV. L. SCH. 
LIBR. (May 9, 2017, 10:58 AM), https://guides.library.harvard.edu/unifmodelacts. 
 140.  Id.; see George A. Hisert, Uniform Commercial Code: Does One Size Fit All?, 28 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 219, 219 (1994) (“[O]ne of the basic precepts of federalism is the individual state’s 
ability to experiment with alternative solutions to problems commonly shared with other states 
and to address those which may not exist in other states.”). 
 141.  See Acts, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Acts.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018) (listing all of the completed acts by the Uniform Law Commission). 
 142.  See supra note 137. 
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provisions.143  In commenting, the original drafters stressed the point of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: “Uniformity throughout the American jurisdic-
tions is one the main objectives of this Code; and that objective cannot be 
obtained without substantial uniformity of construction.”144  The Permanent 
Editorial Board for the UCC thoroughly disapproved of non-uniform revi-
sions to states’ versions of the UCC, advocating for uniformity throughout 
state statutes regulating commercial transactions.145  A crucial part of uni-
formity is looking toward other jurisdictions’ analyses when interpreting 
provisions of the UCC.146  With the vast, intricate set of topics governed by 
the UCC, and the large amount of cases concerning good faith, some sem-
blance of consistency is needed.147 
The official comments of the UCC suggest practical guidelines for the 
interpretation and application of UCC provisions to commercial transac-
tions.148  The 2003 revision to Article 1 sought to maintain clarity in the 
midst of shifting business practices and advancement of the law.149  Of the 
many revisions, the change of good faith’s meaning under Section 1-201 to 
mean “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stand-
ards of fair dealing” aligned with the definition of the previously amended 
Articles.150  Furthermore, implementing the objective standard when meas-
uring good faith substantially affects a court’s determination whether good 
faith exists in cases falling under the entire UCC, not just individual arti-
                                                          
 143.  UCC Article 1, General Provisions (2001) Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%201,%20General%20Pro
visions%20(2001) (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 144.  U.C.C. general cmt. at 2 (2017).  The Comment’s purpose was to “aid in viewing the Act 
as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction.”  Id. 
 145.  Joint Committees: Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code (PEB), 
AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/committees/joint-committees/ (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018). 
 146.  Brooks v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, 57 So.3d 1153, 1159 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 147.  Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and 
Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559, 561 (2006) (listing the number 
of cases from 1945 through 2004 in which the phrase “Implied Covenant of Good Faith” ap-
peared); see also Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But (Still) Not Yet Duplicated, Revised 
UCC Article 1 (Aug. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),  
https://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rowley/RA1.081511.pdf (describing how uniformity “levels the 
playing field” across jurisdictions). 
 148.  Denise R. Boklach, Commercial Transactions: U.C.C. Section 1-201(19) Good Faith—Is 
Now Time to Abandon the Pure Heart/Empty Head Test?, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 647, 650 (1992); see 
also Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc. 630 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980) (rationalizing that the purpose of 
the official comments to the UCC is to promote uniform construction of the UCC). 
 149.  See supra note 143.  Article 1’s revision underwent several changes of a technical, non-
substantive nature as well, such as the reordering and renumbering of sections and adding gender-
neutral terminology.  Id. 
 150.  See supra note 143. 
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cles.151  Simply put, Article 1’s revisions finalized the UCC’s movement 
toward modernization.152 
Where there are deviations from the UCC, there should be a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of “uniformity for uniformity’s sake.”153  Although 
those variations may not affect individual transactions, such variations in-
convenience courts and lawyers who must stay informed of their existence 
and the implications of non-uniformity.154  For instance, the drafting of 
documents or selection of governing law in multistate transactions would 
require attorneys to identify and compare each state’s definition, and then 
select the best option for their client—steps that are undoubtedly time-
consuming.155 
Banking transactions are rarely ever limited to or regulated within the 
confines of one state, rather crossing state lines in a myriad of ways, and lit-
igation from one dispute can very well arise in multiple jurisdictions.156  
Maryland remains one of the few number of states without Article 1’s defi-
nition of good faith.157  Thus, the commercial standard by which Maryland 
banks conduct business should adhere to those other states for the sake of 
uniformity.  By adopting Article 1 in full, Maryland’s definition of good 
faith will be in line with other jurisdictions and truly further the purpose of 
the UCC. 
B.  “A Pure Heart and an Empty Head”158: Standing Alone, the 
Subjective Prong of Good Faith Remains Difficult to Determine 
and Triggers Confusing Interpretation 
Since the implementation of the UCC, many cases have centered on 
the question of whether parties exercised good faith in a variety of transac-
tions.159  More recently, good faith theories have appeared in every stage of 
                                                          
 151.  Why States Should Adopt UCC Article 1, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UCC
%20Article%201 (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Hisert, supra note 140, at 226–27. 
 154.  Id. at 227. 
 155.  Robert Levine, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Part 1, BLOGSPOT 
(Apr. 30, 2015, 8:07 AM), http://ucc-madeeasy.blogspot.com/2015/04/good-faith-under-uniform-
commercial.html. 
 156.  Sparks, supra note 42, at 24 (explaining the ramifications of Maryland’s current law). 
 157.  See supra text accompanying note 59. 
 158.  Me. Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 727 A.2d. 335, 340 
(Me. 1999) (referring to the subjective standard of good faith as “the pure heart and empty head” 
standard); see also Seinfield v. Commercial Bank & Tr. Co., 405 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.) (noting that the Florida version of the UCC “seem[s] to protect the objectively stupid so 
long as he is subjectively pure at heart.”). 
 159.  See generally U.C.C. CASE DIG. (West, eds. 2009) (providing up-to-date coverage of all 
50 states interpreting and applying the UCC). 
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the lending relationship, from loan negotiation to retaking collateral to ex-
tending lines of credit.160  To determine the meaning of good faith, one must 
bear in mind the following considerations: (1) the specific language under 
Section 1-201; (2) additional language under applicable articles; and (3) of-
ficial comments to the statute.161 
How a court construes the meaning of good faith under the MUCC, 
and in other states with solely the subjective standard, can be seemingly ar-
bitrary.162  Gauging “honesty in fact” is an “essentially subjective test which 
focuses on the state of mind of the person in question.”163  Essentially, 
courts must ascertain the thought process of individuals, and often corpora-
tions as well, and whether they were truthful and behaved honestly, from 
their own perspective.164  But how does one effectively prove a dishonest 
state of mind of an individual, let alone a business entity? 
Prior to Revised Article 1, the UCC did not provide instructions to the 
courts on how to interpret this “white heart” test.165  The ensuing confusion 
strips good faith of any practical meaning, rendering it nothing but an emp-
ty expression and diminishing its value where it is most needed.166  The 
subjective standard is vague at best, functioning as “too limited to be taken 
seriously in the performance and enforcement context . . . .”167  Further-
more, the subjective standard provides no guidelines to a court for a bank’s 
behavior where its honest intent blurs the lines with negligence or lack of 
diligence.  A single good faith definition will clarify confusion as to which 
standard applies in the multiple subjects that are governed by the UCC.168  
For example, Maryland courts would no longer need to differentiate be-
tween a merchant or a non-merchant to determine the relevant standard of 
good faith.169 
                                                          
 160.  Paul Matthew Jones, Good Faith Theories of Lender Liability, 48 LA. L. REV. 1181, 
1185–86 (1988). 
 161.  Boklach, supra note 148, at 650. 
 162.  Id. at 647 (stating “[i]n some respects, good faith is a bit like obscenity, i.e., the judge 
knows it when he sees it.” (referencing a quote by Justice Stewart in his attempt to define obsceni-
ty in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964))). 
 163.  Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 425 F.2d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2005); Prenger 
v. Baker, 542 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Iowa 1995) (“This definition has been universally interpreted to 
require a wholly subjective test examining what the party actually believed at the time of the 
transaction.”). 
 164.  Rowley, supra note 147, at 4. 
 165.  The subjective standard of good faith has been alternatively coined the “white heart” test.  
Eldon’s Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 282, 
287 (Minn. 1973). 
 166.  Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1994). 
 167.  Id.  
 168.  Boklach, supra note 148, at 676. 
 169.  Id. 
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In order to serve its purpose, good faith “requires some objective 
standard tied to commercial reasonableness.”170  Without such an objective 
standard, good faith has no logical meaning.  There may be differing opin-
ions as to what exactly reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing are, 
as even courts within the same district often reach different conclusions 
based on the particularized facts and evidence.171  There will always be po-
tential barriers to predicting the outcome of cases.172  However, adding an 
objective component should only lead to more equitable outcomes.173  Ul-
timately, the purely subjective standard does not account for the actions of a 
reasonable individual, and gives leeway to actions that are offensive but not 
definitively dishonest.174  The standard also fails to consider how UCC 
transactions should embody fairness and commercial reasonableness.175  It 
sensibly follows that commercial transactions falling underneath the MUCC 
should include objectivity; otherwise, there is no ascertainable benefit in 
having the standard at all.176 
C.  Standing Alone, the Subjective Standard Tips the Balancing Scale 
of Justice in Favor of Banks, Leaving Lender Liability Unchecked 
Lender liability cases typically involve a bank’s abuse of its institu-
tional power over a borrower in order to protect its own interests.177  Ex-
tending a good faith obligation to the lender-borrower relationship serves as 
an effective means of addressing the potential abusive practices of banks.178  
An alarming trend in cases decided solely under the subjective standard 
                                                          
 170.  E. Allen Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 671 (1963).  But see Jones, supra note 
160, at 1196 (“In an unstable industry, with a diverse group of lenders, a reasonable standard may 
be difficult to ascertain.”). 
 171.  Boklach, supra note 148, at 686. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id.  But see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-3, at 1089–90 (2d ed. 1980) (positing that the result of 
most cases would be the same under either good faith standard). 
 174.  William H. Lawrence & Robert D. Wilson, Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in 
Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63 IND. L. J. 825, 833 (1988); see Farnsworth, supra 
note 170, at 672 (“Both common sense and tradition dictate an objective standard for good faith 
performance.”); id. at 674 (limiting the definition of good faith to honesty in fact alone left the 
concept “enfeebled”). 
 175.  Lawrence & Wilson, supra note 174, at 833. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Kenneth J. Goldberg, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REV. 653, 654 (1988).  
“[E]ven the most sophisticated borrower is subject to the discretionary judgment of a lender under 
many loan agreements, a situation in which the lender may potentially abuse its institutional pow-
er.”  Id. at 665–66 (footnote omitted).  See generally State Nat’l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. 
Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 686 (Tex. App. 1984) (noting that the borrower established economic duress 
by showing that the lender implied that the loan would be called if a former CEO, disliked by the 
lender, resumed management of the borrower company). 
 178.  Goldberg, supra note 177, at 657. 
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shows that banks were often not held accountable for their behavior if a 
court determined they acted with “honesty,” even where the consequences 
were detrimental.179  Examples of banks violating their duty of good faith 
include: exercise of undue control over the borrower’s business; improper 
acceleration of a note and/or declaration of default; failure to provide ad-
vance notice of a default or termination of credit; creation of excuses to 
avoid extensions of credit or advances on funds; improper exercise of off-
sets; adding additional loan conditions; improper foreclosure and disposi-
tion of collateral; and not providing reasonable notice to cure defaults.180 
From the beginning stages of drafting the UCC, advocates for the 
banking industry played a large role in its developments—particularly the 
Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar 
Association.181  Without surprise, banking advocates have baulked at the 
idea of incorporating the objective reasonableness standard—resistance that 
spans more than half a century.182  During the drafting and revision process, 
the concept of good faith (which included variations of an objective com-
ponent) faced criticism for allegedly creating an impossible standard for 
brokers, banks, and similar institutions to observe at all times.183  Thus, the 
standard was abandoned to alleviate concerns of business people and busi-
ness lawyers alike.184  Commentators believed that the “moralistic” nature 
of the concepts of “good” and “bad” faith have led to a “sue the bank” men-
tality, making banks a favorable target by plaintiffs during economic tur-
moil.185  In recent times of nearly all states’ conformity with Article 1 of the 
UCC, there has been no clear explanation by Maryland’s banking advocates 
                                                          
 179.  See supra Part I.C.1.   
 180.  Brian Mahany, Bank’s Duty of Good Faith, JUDGE LANG & KATERS & MAHANY L., 
https://www.lenderliabilitylawyer.com/video.php?article=brian-mahany-good-faith-lender_57 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 181.  Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 BUS. LAW. 113, 113 (1951). 
 182.  The 1951 ABA committee report, which objected to the objective standard of good faith, 
expressed concern that including such would require courts to invoke difficult considerations of 
usages of trade, customs, and practices.  Walter D. Malcolm et al., Report of Committee on the 
Proposed Commercial Code, 6 BUS. LAW. 119, 128 (1951); see, e.g., Werner F. Ebke & James R. 
Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 SW. L. J. 775, 798 
(1986) (asserting that duty of good faith “provides no objectively identifiable guidelines concern-
ing the bounds of legally permissible conduct. . . .” and it is “inconsistent with the basic notion of 
fairness that notice be given as to what activities are legally permitted or prohibited.”); Loeb H. 
Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability: Flawed Application of Old Concepts, 104 
BANKING L. J. 492, 499 (1987) (stating that the obligation of good faith has been at times misused 
by borrowers “as a specious weapon for recovery”). 
 183.  Malcolm et al., supra note 182, at 131. 
 184.  Id. at 127. 
 185.  See Mark Snyderman, What’s So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance 
Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1988); Granoff, supra note 
182, at 515. 
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as to why adding the objective definition is not in the best interest of com-
mercial practices for all.186 
The subjective standard of good faith has faced substantial criticism in 
the creditor-debtor context, one being that the standard grants creditors ex-
cessive leeway that imposes a difficult burden of proof on the debtor.187  As 
one judge adequately phrased this concern: 
[A] purely subjective test is subject to arbitrary abuse.  It would 
allow a creditor to be unreasonable and place the debtor in an un-
just position since the creditor might at any time call the entire 
debt and require the debtor to prove the non-existent state of mind 
of the creditor.  Thus, under this interpretation, the code would 
permit a creditor to destroy a viable contractual relationship with-
out requiring him to justify his actions.188 
For example, where insecurity clauses are present, the subjective 
standard of honesty of fact is undoubtedly insufficient to balance the inter-
ests of both parties.  “A declaration of insecurity is a unilateral decision 
made by the creditor which places a severe hardship upon the debtor.  This 
hardship is unjust if the creditor’s decision is unreasonable or based upon 
mistaken facts which the creditor may honesty believe to be true.”189  Pro-
fessor Grant Gilmore, one of the original UCC drafters, warned against the 
use of insecurity clauses as a “charter of irresponsibility” for creditors.190  
Simply put, in a space where consumers enter commercial contracts with 
less bargaining power and control, the subjective definition can be prob-
lematic and is more advantageous to banks.191  Incorporating a commercial-
ly reasonable objective standard is a fairer standard for courts to enforce 
against all parties.192 
                                                          
 186.  See supra text accompanying notes 84–86. 
 187.  Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (Gar-
rard, J., concurring); see also Goldberg, supra note 177, at 679 (arguing that the K.M.C. standard 
of good faith will deter malicious lender actions while a wholly subjective approach will not). 
 188.  Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 329 N.E.2d at 626 (footnotes omitted). 
 189.  Richards Eng’rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. App. 1987). 
 190.  GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1197 (1965).  
 191.  Jones, supra note 160, at 1195.  Another concern of the subjective test is how the bor-
rower is also subjected to their lender’s risk adversity, an uncontrollable factor, by being forced to 
behave in a manner that will not alarm their lender.  Id.; see also Lending Liability Lawyers, 
JUDGE, LANG & KATERS AND MAHANY L., https://www.lenderliabilitylawyer.com (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2018) (stating that banks have too much power and large businesses are at their mercy). 
 192.  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) cmt. 20 (2017) (“Although ‘fair dealing’ is a broad term that must 
be defined in context, it is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the 
care with which an act is performed.  This is an entirely different concept than whether a party 
exercised ordinary care in conducting a transaction.”).  But see Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on 
the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L. J. 619, 637 (1981) (arguing that the ambiguity of an 
expanded good faith definition would cause remedies to be administered arbitrarily and unevenly 
by courts). 
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Another concern is the possibility of contract drafters for banking enti-
ties, who have the freedom to create their own forms and terms, employing 
choice of law provisions that allow them to select Maryland law, which 
would reduce their level of accountability.193  Forum shopping may also run 
rampant.194  In most commercial contracts or transactions, consumers rarely 
have the ability to bargain either choice of law or the forum—provisions 
left to commercial entities’ choosing.195  In all, the very nature of a consum-
er’s relationship with a bank is one of unequal power. 
Maryland’s banking industry and its advocates should not fear an ab-
rupt change to the standard of good faith for three reasons.  First, imposing 
an objective standard can be beneficial to individuals and banks by provid-
ing determinate procedures as a defense to any claims, preventing frivolous 
lawsuits.196  The purpose of the UCC’s requirement of good faith can be 
traced back to protecting parties’ expectations of the agreement, and the ob-
jective standard can help courts frame the reasonableness of those expecta-
tions.197  Second, guidelines exist to assist financial institutions with meet-
ing the objective component of the good faith standard within the assorted 
topics covered by the UCC.198  Third, incorporating the objective standard 
will not negate the subjective portion—a bank may still operate on subjec-
tive beliefs in its decisionmaking, but with an objective limitation that cur-
tails improper actions by the bank.199  The days of banks behaving with lit-
                                                          
 193.  Sparks, supra note 42, at 24–25. 
 194.  Id. at 25.  Forum shopping is the practice of litigants selecting courts most likely to pro-
vide a favorable judgment by employing a forum selection clause, which courts tend to enforce 
when concerning commercial agreements.  17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 253 (2018). 
 195.  Marty Gould, The Conflict Between Forum-Selection Clauses and State Consumer Pro-
tection Laws: Why Illinois Got It Right in Jane Doe v. Match.com, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 671, 699 
(2015) (discussing how the forum-selection and choice of law clauses in contracts can cause the 
“wholesale displacement of state consumer protection laws”); see also James J. Healy, Consumer 
Protection Choice of Law: European Lessons for the United States, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
535, 535 (2009) (pointing out how American courts do not always apply the public policy viola-
tion exception in consumer contracts, often leaving consumers unprotected). 
 196.  Burton, supra note 166, at 1535.  But see Snyderman, supra note 185, at 1338 (arguing 
that the objective portion of the good faith standard, in a lender liability context, “upset[s] the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties and significantly limit[s] the flexibility available to lenders and 
borrowers in furtherance of commercial transactions.”).  
 197.  Jones, supra note 160, at 1191.  
 198.  Mark E. Wilson & Jeremy D. Kerman, What is Good Faith? Subjective and Objective 
Standards for Banks Accepting Payment Orders, A.B.A. BANKING L. COMM. J. (Mar. 2012),  
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/201203/wilson-
kerman.pdf (pointing out that the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council established 
guidelines for meeting the objective component in regards to funds transfers, especially Internet 
schemes such as “phishing” frauds). 
 199.  Jones, supra note 160, at 1196 (“Put another way, certain actions of the lender, such as 
foreclosing when fully secured and when the borrower was not in default, invade too far the ex-
pectations of the borrower.”).  But see Farnsworth, supra note 170, at 672 (questioning the need 
for an objective test if a court, in attempting to evaluate the credibility of a claim, also considers 
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the claim even under the honesty-in-fact test). 
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tle repercussions are long gone, and with lender liability continuously 
evolving, judges and juries are no longer privy to finding all actions of a 
bank as just and fair.200 
D.  Maryland as a Lone Wolf: Potential Theories as to Why Maryland 
Has Yet to Adopt Article 1 
The Maryland legislature has never shied away from adopting parts of 
the UCC, embracing Article 1 (in-part) along with every other Article with-
in the UCC.  Why, then, has the Maryland legislature chosen to apply the 
two-prong standard of good faith to Title 2 only, effectively subjecting 
merchants to a different level of judicial scrutiny unlike most other jurisdic-
tions?  This question invokes a number of theories.  Perhaps it was an unin-
tentional oversight, as evidenced by the House Bill 700’s Fiscal and Policy 
Note.201  The definition of good faith within the Fiscal and Policy Note’s 
analysis portion (which is meant to describe the proposed changes to any 
bill) did not differ from the definition found in the current law segment 
(which is meant to state the law as it stood prior to any amendments).202  
Perhaps this discrepancy was a drafting error, meaning that the legislature’s 
intention was to include the subjective-objective definition all along. 
Another theory involves the challenging landscape of Maryland’s 
banking industry, still combating low interest rates, increased regulatory 
demands after the recession, and pressure from shareholders.203  As a state 
with many community-based banks, constant regulatory and legislative 
changes would require additional funding to accommodate additional train-
ing.204  Perhaps it is more beneficial to Maryland banks (and those who ad-
vocate for them) to avoid any changes to comply with the UCC while still 
undergoing a recovery process, if ever at all.  Furthermore, Maryland, a 
state recently recognized as one of the most undesirable places to start a 
business, faces mounting pressure to become more business-friendly.205  
                                                          
 200.  See JUDGE, LANG & KATERS AND MAHANY L., supra note 191.  But see Snyderman, su-
pra note 185, at 1338 (“[Objective reasonableness] creates a needless presumption that allows 
judges and juries to substitute their conceptions of reasonableness and fairness for those of parties 
more knowledgeable about the realities of the market.  The inconsistent application of the good 
faith doctrine to lending practices adds uncertainty and other costs to business transactions in ab-
rogation of the fundamental purposes of commercial law.”). 
 201.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Carrie Wells, The Number of Community Banks in Maryland is Shrinking, BALT. SUN 
(Oct. 16, 2015, 9:08 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-bank-mergers-20151016-
story.html. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Jeffrey Ferguson, Opinion, Can Larry Hogan Keep Maryland Open for Business?, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/can-larry-hogan-keep-
maryland-open-for-business/2016/02/19/32a56d90-cea1-11e5-88cd-
753e80cd29ad_story.html?utm_term=.7531148f22dc; Jeff Jeffrey, Md. Ranks Among Worst States 
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Banks are businesses, and perhaps keeping Maryland’s statutory standards 
as they are is a way to promote an “open for business” atmosphere that will 
deter businesses—even banks—from leaving the state and boost the confi-
dence of business leaders.206 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Maryland remains one of the few states that has not adopted amended 
Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code, maintaining the definition of 
good faith as “honesty in fact in the transaction or conduct concerned.”207  
As a result, the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code does not promote its 
intended purpose of uniformity in relation to other jurisdictions, specifically 
where commercial transactions frequently transcend state lines.208  If courts 
are to rely on the sole subjective definition of good faith, confusion and 
varying interpretations ensue due to the empty-headed and vague con-
cept.209  Case law has shown, more often than not, that the subjective stand-
ard leaves room for dishonest practices amongst banks and weakens lender 
liability, leaving troubling circumstances for those affected.210  The Mary-
land General Assembly should amend Title 1 to comply with Article 1’s 
definition of good faith, adding in the objective standard of observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, as nearly all other states 
have done.  Doing so will promote and uphold uniformity, provide a clearer 
standard for courts to enforce and for parties to measure, and ensure fair-
ness amongst all parties involved in a banking relationship. 
 
 
                                                          
to Start a New Business, Two Studies Find, BALT. B. J. (July 6, 2017, 11:04 AM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/news/2017/07/06/md-ranks-among-worst-states-to-start-a-
new.html (calculating Maryland’s ranking by looking at the overall business environment, access 
to resources, and business costs). 
 206.  Ferguson, supra note 205 (describing how government officials of Maryland are trying to 
improve its image and job climate); Jay Steinmetz, Md. should look to Va. for business example, 
BALT. SUN (Oct. 6, 2017, 1:20 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-
1008-steinmetz-column-20171004-story.html (describing how some measures proposed by Mary-
land legislators caused bad publicity and poisoned relations with the business community). 
 207.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 208.  See supra Part II.A. 
 209.  See supra Part II.B. 
 210.  See supra Part II.C. 
